Executive Summary

EU Member States have a shared interest in a strong, effective and successful European Union. For this
to happen, it is essential that its institutions themselves operate according to the principles of the rule of
law, in accordance with the Treaties, using transparent and accountable procedures, respecting institutional
competences, and ensuring fair and equitable judicial procedures. However, there are risks of serious breaches
of the rule of law in the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the
European Union. These risks are related to the existence of identifiable practices in the functioning of the
EU institutions which are in contravention of the Treaties of the European Union, arbitrary, covert and
illegitimate expansion of powers (i.e., competence creep), and widespread corruption within the institutions.
In many cases the foregoing is facilitated by the opaque functioning of the institutions, inadequate internal
rules, and a lack of accountability. The breaches of the rule of law that have been identified can mainly be
grouped into the following four areas.

I. A lack of consequences related to corruption cases undermines trust in
EU institutions

There has been no institutional reform aimed at strengthening the integrity of the Commission. This is
despite Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s management of the procurement of Pfizer vaccines
in a non-transparent manner which bypassed official channels, and the suspicions of corruption and money
laundering linked to the term of former Justice Commissioner Didier Reynders, which emerged after the
end of his mandate.
The so-called “Qatargate” affair – one of the EU’s biggest corruption scandals – involves the European
Parliament, the protracted immunity waiver procedures of which are designed to protect not the integrity
of the EP, but those accused of common criminal offences. The immunity of Marc Tarabella, accused of
involvement in Qatargate, was waived by the EP in just 17 days, but the immunity of two MEPs accused this
year of involvement in the scandal had still not been concluded after more than 70 days (up to the date on
which this report went to press). The cases of other MEPs accused of common criminal offences – such
as Péter Magyar and Ilaria Salis – still await a decision after more than 200 days.
At a systemic level, investigations into individual cases are – in terms of the integrity of EU institutions –
essentially a facade that serves not to prevent such cases, but to delay accountability.

II. The accumulation of incompatible positions produces a persistent risk
of abuse

Certain lobbying organisations, such as Transparency International and European Movement International,
exert excessive and opaque influence on the European institutions.
The Commission routinely approves, before the end of the two-year “cooling-off period” after they have
left office, the appointment of former Commissioners to positions in organisations that have previously
lobbied those Commissioners when they were in office. In one case, such an organisation is still benefiting
from a EUR 4.5 million grant previously allocated to it by the Directorate-General overseen by a former Commissioner who now works for it.

Personal links between the Commission and the judges of the Court of Justice of the European Union
jeopardise the impartiality of judicial proceedings between Member States and the Commission. There are,
and have been, a number of judges at the Court of Justice of the European Union who have had careers
in the Commission spanning decades. A Dutch-born judge was appointed last October after ending a 30-
year career at the Commission as Deputy Director-General of the Directorate-General for Competition.
He went to the Court of Justice after having been responsible for monitoring, control and investigation of
state aid.

III. EU funds are being outsourced to NGOs in a non-transparent way

Through LIFE and other EU funding programmes, the Commission funds a number of lobbying
organisations – including an environmental lobby organisation that has participated in more than 300
registered lobbying events in Parliament and at the Commission. This organisation, which has 45 accredited
lobbyists in the EP, received 10 percent of its 2024 budget from LIFE (it also benefits from other EU
programmes). During the process of providing funding for lobbying organisations, external experts who
assess the Commission’s distribution of EU funds are allowed to decide even on potential support for their
own organisations.

IV. Systemic double standards seriously undermine legal certainty

Political parties at European level can be dissolved on the grounds that they do not respect the values of
the Union. In the procedure to deregister parties, the opinion of a “committee of independent eminent
persons” must be sought and taken into account. Since January 2025 this committee has included someone
who is a member of the Scientific Council of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS).
This person has stated – in a “Next Left” publication released by FEPS – that she does not consider either
Poland’s PiS or Hungary’s Fidesz to be parties that respect EU values. A procedure based on the subjective
opinion of a politically biased person, which can lead to the exclusion of parties, is a fundamental violation
of the right to a fair hearing, and also draws attention to systemic double standards in the EU.
The Commission’s inconsistent application of the Article 7 procedure, which lacks a uniform standard, is a
breach of EU legal certainty. The Commission first condemned Poland for lack of judicial independence,
and then abruptly closed the procedure without any substantive results when the Tusk government was
elected. With regard to Romania, however, despite the annulment of that country’s presidential election,
the Commission has not initiated proceedings to protect the independence of the judiciary, democracy
or the rule of law.

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

1. The procedure on suspending the immunity of MEPs suspected of common criminal offences can be very protracted, as it is not subject to any deadline
2. Lobbying organisations involved in corruption scandals continue to be able to influence the work of the European Parliament
3. Transparency International exerts excessive influence
4. European-level political parties can be effectively dissolved on the grounds that they do not respect the Union’s values, and during this procedure it is mandatory to seek the opinion of a member of the scientific council of a foundation linked to the Party of European Socialists
5. The so-called “cordon sanitaire” discriminates against the EP’s third largest political group, and thus obstructs expression of the will of EU citizens

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

6. The European Media Freedom Act, which seeks to standardise press regulation at EU level, represents an example of competence creep
7. Corruption cases involving Ursula von der Leyen and her Commissioners continue to incur no consequences
8. The European Commission is engaged in the opaque funding of lobbying organisations which act as pressure groups within EU institutions and in Member States
9. There is a systemic risk of conflict of interest, as external experts evaluating the allocation of EU funds may decide on funding for their own organisations
10. The European Commission applies the Article 7 procedure inconsistently, targeting Poland for a supposed lack of judicial independence, while not addressing the Constitutional Court of Romania’s annulment of the Romanian presidential election
11. Four outgoing Commissioners were too quickly permitted to take up posts at lobbying organisations with which they were associated during their term on the Commission

THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

12. The fact that a Dutch-born judge of the Court served the Commission for thirty years represents a conflict of interests
13. There is a risk of corruption arising from the fact that, within 24 days of the end of his mandate, the Danish ECJ Vice-President took up a position at a law firm involved in the Court’s proceedings
14. The impartiality of the Court is compromised by the fact that its German Vice-President is a member of the board of trustees of a political organisation which criticises Member States on ideological grounds
15. The Advocate General of the Court exceeded his powers when in his Opinion he criticised the independence and impartiality of the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland

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